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SURROGATE PARENTHOOD-AN ANALYSIS OF THE
PROBLEMS AND A SOLUTION: REPRESENTATION
FOR THE CHILD
The rapid advance of reproductive technology has made surrogate parenting
arrangements more common. This Note reviews existing artificial insemina-
tion statutes, adoption statutes, as well as the common law which bears upon
surrogate parenting. The Note also analyzes legislation that was proposed in
the Minnesota House of Representatives in 1983 by examining the legal is-
sues that the legislation attempted to address. The Note concludes that repre-
sentation for the child is necessary to properly address the issues surrounding
inheritance rights, custody, support, and the child's right to know his
parentage.
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INTRODUCTION
Surrogate mother wanted. Couple unable to have child willing to
pay $10,000 fee and expenses to woman to carry husband's child.
Conception by artificial insemination. All replies strictly
confidential. I
Advertisements similar to the above have provoked considerable
debate concerning alternative forms of reproduction such as surro-
gate parenting. In the typical surrogate parenthood agreement, the
woman agrees to be impregnated without engaging in intercourse.
2
The surrogate mother3 agrees to carry the fetus to full term and then
surrender the baby to the biological father.4 This arrangement may
be made with or without the aid of counsel.5 Surrogate parenting
arrangements raise ethical issues that must be confronted by society
at large. The Minnesota Legislature should address these issues by
drafting appropriately tailored legislation.
The first section of this Note discusses the nature of the relation-
ship between parties to a surrogate contract. The second section re-
views the two types of statutes courts use to analyze surrogate
parenting issues and discusses the resulting problems created by
such analyses. The third section discusses the current case law on
surrogate parenting. The Note then examines the contents of the
surrogate agreement and the problems of fashioning a remedy in the
case of a breach. The fifth section reviews legislation proposed in
1. Wallis, A Surrogate's Story, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 53. For further discussion
of advertising, see infra note 6.
2. Lack of sexual intercourse characterizes the surrogate contract. An agree-
ment requiring a woman to engage in sexual intercourse with a man with the intent
of being a surrogate would be considered adulterous. In some states, adultery is a
crime. See, e.g., MICH. CoMp. L. ANN. § 750.30 (West 1968). But see In re Marriage of
L.M.S. v. S.L.S., 105 Wis. 2d 118,312 N.W.2d 853 (1981) (husband's suggestion that
wife become pregnant by another man sufficient to require a legal obligation to sup-
port the child).
Surrogate motherhood, however, is not without its opponents in the United
States and abroad. Pierce, Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, 11
FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 3001, 3002 (1985). In the United States, the National Commit-
tee For Adoption, Inc. has found overwhelming opposition to surrogate parenting.
Id. In that organization's view, surrogate parenting involves legal and moral
problems affecting both children and parents adversely. Id In Europe, the most
extensive examination of surrogate parenting was conducted in the United Kingdom
by the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology. That com-
mittee recommended that legislation render criminal the activities of surrogate agen-
cies or professionals who assist in the surrogate parenting. Id.
3. The woman may be single or married. For further discussion, see infra text
and accompanying notes 20-27.
4. The employer may be single or married. For a discussion of employers of
surrogates, see infra text and accompanying notes 7-19.
5. It is the contention of this Note that the employer, the surrogate, and the
child should be independently represented by counsel.
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the Minnesota House of Representatives which was designed to alle-
viate many of the problems inherent in the surrogate arrangement.
Finally, the last section of the Note proposes representation for the
surrogate child, followed by a discussion of the role of the child's
representative in solving surrogate parenting issues.
I. NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP
In most contractual agreements, the respective parties meet and
reach agreement on the terms of the contract. In the typical surro-
gate parenting arrangement, the two parties often are strangers who
make contact through advertisements. 6
A. Employer Characteristics
The exact number of surrogate births is unknown.7 Married
couples are the most frequent employers of surrogates. There are a
number of reasons why couples may seek surrogates. The primary
reason is infertility of me wife.8 It is estimated that one in six Ameri-
can couples now face some type of infertility problem.9 Surrogate
parenthood addresses infertility in women, while artificial insemina-
tion attempts to remedy infertility in men.10 Advocates of surrogate
parenthood contend that "surrogate motherhood arrangements...
strengthen a family since they offer a solution to childless couples
whose marriages are endangered by their desperate desire for chil-
6. The surrogate may often be the subject of advertising. See Griffin, Woman for
Rent, 9 STUDENr LAw., Apr. 1981, at 29. One commentator has suggested that surro-
gate advertisements may be constitutionally protected. Graham, Surrogate Gestation
and the Protection of Choice, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 291, 297-98 (1982). For examples
of such advertisements, see Note, Surrogate Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies
Under Legislative Proposals, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 601, 601 n.1 (1983).
7. KEANE, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 14 (1981). Noel Keane, a Dearborn, Michi-
gan attorney, represented the first couple to pursue surrogate motherhood as an al-
ternative to traditional adoption. Id. at 23, 28. Keane has estimated that in 1978,
three out of 3.5 million births were to surrogate mothers. As of 1980, there were
about 100 children born to surrogates and adopted by others. Id. at 14.
8. See Bird, Surrogate Motherhood hers? yours? ours?, CALIFORNIA LAw., Feb. 1982,
21, 22. Research has found that infertility is caused by male deficiencies 40% of the
time. See Wallis, The Saddest Epidemic, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 50. Problems with both
members occur in 20% of the reported cases. Id
9. See Wallis, supra note 8, at 50. Reproductive endocrinologist Martin Quigley
calls it "an epidemic" of infertility. Id In the past 20 years the occurrence of infertil-
ity has nearly tripled. Id. Some researchers attribute the incidence of infertility to
liberalized sexual attitudes resulting in genital infections. Id. Other causes of infer-
tility are delayed childbirth, the low body fat in women athletes, stress, low sperm
counts, and blocked sperm ducts in men. Id
10. The surrogate participates more intensely in the surrogate arrangement than
does the donor in the artificial insemination by donor (AID) arrangement. She is
involved physically, emotionally, and mentally for at least nine months. For a defini-
tion of AID, see infra note 30.
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dren having been frustrated by one spouse's reproductive
inabilities.""
Surrogate parenthood is often used for a purely practical reason.
The widespread use of birth control, the liberalization of adoption
and abortion laws, and the social acceptance of unwed mothers have
created a shortage of "adoptable babies."12 The average waiting pe-
riod for an "adoptable baby" is seven years.1S Thus, surrogate
parenthood, like other reproductive techniques, operates as an alter-
native to adoption.14
An additional reason why couples choose surrogate parenthood is
their strong desire to protect the concept of the "family unit." Sur-
rogate parenthood arrangements satisfy this desire since the child is
11. Comment, Two Mothers, One Baby, No Law, 11 HUM. RTS. 27, 28 (Summer
1983). See also Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 2 S. Ia.. U.L.J. 147, 155-
56 (1980).
12. Bird, supra note 8, at 20-21. Other factors which have created the shortage
are environmental pollutants, venereal disease, and certain forms of contraception
such as intrauterine devices. Id. at 22. Because there are not enough healthy "adopt-
able babies" in the United States, the Children's Home Society of Minnesota, for
example, places a large number of infants from foreign locations such as Korea, Latin
America, and Hong Kong. The Children's Home Society receives approximately
15,000 inquiries per year, with actual placement of between 400 and 500 children.
Telephone interview with Ms. Mary Scanlan, Adoption Program Assistant for the
Children's Home Society of Minnesota (Jan. 19, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Scanlan
Interview].
13. Comment, Surrogate Motherhood in California: Legislative Proposals, 18 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 341, 342 (1981). Attorney Philip Adams of San Francisco notes that in the
1960's there were approximately 13,000 adoptions annually in California. By 1978-
79, the figure dropped to around 4,200. Agencies arranged some 2,200 of those
adoptions, but received more than 10 times that number of adoption requests. Bird,
supra note 8, at 22. The average waiting period in Minnesota is typically 12 to 16
months. Scanlan Interview, supra note 12. Such delays either create a "black market"
for children, or force couples to seek other options. Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of
Surrogate Gestation, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 107, 108 nn.4-8 (1982). In the most com-
mon black market baby arrangement, an intermediary, usually a doctor or lawyer,
agrees to provide a young woman with expenses in exchange for the baby. An esti-
mated four to five thousand "black market" arrangements occur every year. Article,
Black-Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAw. 48, 49-51 (1976).
Alexander Morgan Capron, a professor of law at Georgetown University, de-
scribed some of the new reproductive techniques. Capron testified before a House
science subcommittee, "[M]any of the new reproductive possibilities remain so novel
that terms are lacking to describe the human relationships they can create." Fried-
rich, A Legal, Moral, Social Nightmare, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 54. One type of repro-
duction, in vitro fertilization (frequently referred to as "test-tube babies"), has
become a standard part of medical practice. The world's first "test-tube baby," Lou-
ise Brown, was born in 1978. Wallis, supra note 1, at 46. Since 1978, approximately
2,600 "test-tube" babies have been born. Wallis, supra note 1, at 53.
14. Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not so Novel After All, THE HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Oct. 1983, 28, 28.
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biologically related to the father.15
Surrogates may be employed for other less common reasons. For
example, women who do not wish to undergo pregnancy for career
or health reasons may choose a surrogate. These women may be
married or single. Alternatively, a single man may wish to hire a sur-
rogate.16 Although society has been slow to accept single parents,
the Constitution precludes discrimination against them.17
Another group of potential employers whose rights are even less
clear are homosexual couples. Homosexuals have not yet received
the same treatment as other classes.18 Despite the difficulties, surro-
gate agreements may serve as viable alternatives for these
individuals. 19
B. Surrogate Characteristics
The question most often asked about surrogate mothers is why
they undertake the inherent responsibility of the arrangement. In
fact, most surrogates have already raised children, and many surro-
gates are married. 20
Certain women choose the surrogate role because the fee provides
a better economic opportunity than alternative forms of employ-
ment.2' It is this motive that opponents most often cite as objection-
able, based on moral grounds.22 The practice of employing others
15. A biological link is also accomplished with other types of reproduction tech-
nology such as AID and in vitro fertilization. See supra note 13 and infra note 30.
16. See infra note 166.
17. Restricting procedure solely to married couples is a potential violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. Non-married individuals have been allowed
to adopt children, obtain custody of their illegitimate children, and withhold
consent for their illegitimate children's adoption. Constitutional protection
in matters of procreation, however, have traditionally been found to be pro-
tected through a right to privacy. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1985), the Court held that the right to privacy was premised on relation-
ships between partners in traditional marriages.
Note, Surrogate Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies under Legislative Proposals, 23
WASHBURN L.J. 601, 626-28 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
18. For a discussion of the rights of the homosexual parent, see generally Payne,
The Law and the Problem Parent: Custody and Parental Rights of Homoseual, Mentally Re-
tarded, Mentally Ill and Incarcerated Parents, 16 J. FAm. L. 797, 799-802 (1977-78) (dis-
cussion of custody suits involving lesbian mother's unfitness); Note, Lesbian Family:
Rights In Conflict Under the California Unform Parentage Act, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV.
1007 (1980) (discussion of available alternatives for lesbian couples to have
children).
19. Otherwise, the homosexual couple would likely be childless or unable to
have a child with a biological link to one of the parents.
20. Robertson, supra note 14, at 29.
21. See id. at 33. In an interview with Time Magazine, one surrogate stated, "The
money could help pay for my children's education or just generally to make their
lives better." Wallis, supra note 8, at 53.
22. Robertson, supra note 14, at 33.
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to assist in childrearing is, however, widely accepted. 23 Further-
more, sperm donors are routinely paid a reasonable value for their
services. 24 Given the surrogate's greater physical commitment, time
commitment, and emotional involvement, denying her the reason-
able value of her services is unjust.
Other reasons why surrogates assume their role are less tangible
than the economic factors. Many surrogates feel a sense of fulfill-
ment in giving "the gift of life" to another couple. 25 Others want to
have the experience of bearing and giving birth to a child without the
obligation of rearing a child.26 For some women, the surrogate ex-
perience provides a healthy means of mastering guilt from past
abortions.27
II. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
At the present time, states do not directly regulate surrogate
parenthood contracts, but rather, they attempt to regulate indirectly
through existing legislation.28 Consequently, states rely on artificial
insemination statutes or adoption statutes as a means of regulating
surrogate parenthood contracts.29
23. Child care is just one example. The percentage of women participating in
the work force has grown 30% in the past 35 years. Child Care Grows as a Benefit, Bus.
WEEK, Dec. 21, 1982, at 60-63. Both economic necessity and dual career family
structures have initiated such change.
24. A recent study estimated that approximately 90% of sperm donors were paid
between $20 and $30. A small portion of the donors were paid up to $100. Annas,
Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor, 14 FAm. L.Q. 1, 6 (1980).
25. Robertson, supra note 14, at 29.
26. Id
27. Id. See also Wallis, supra note 8, at 53 (need to alleviate guilt about past abor-
tion by bearing someone else's child).
28. See infra note 32. There has been some discussion of surrogate parenthood
on the federal level. On August 9, 1984, the House of Representatives' Committee
on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, held
hearings on reproductive technologies. 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) at 3002.
29. States may also consider fetal experimentation statutes as a means of regulat-
ing surrogate parenthood contracts. For example, subdivision three Minnesota Stat-
utes section 145.422 provides: "Whoever buys or sells a living human conceptus or
nonrenewable organ of the body is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. Nothing in this
subdivision prohibits (1) the buying and selling of a cell culture line or lines taken
from a non-living human conceptus .... " MINN. STAT. § 145.422, subd. 3 (1984).
"'Human conceptus' means any human organism, conceived either in the
human body or produced in an artificial environment other than the human body,
from fertilization through the first 265 days thereafter." ld § 145.421, subd. 2. Liv-
ing is defined as the "presence of evidence of life, such as movement, heart or respir-
atory activity, the presence of electroencephalographic or electrocardiographic
activity." Id., subd. 3.
[Vol. 12
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A. Artificial Insemination Statutes
1. History and Development
States with artificial insemination3 0 statutes often apply the stat-
utes' provisions to resolve surrogate contract issues. In 1964, Geor-
gia enacted the first artificial insemination statute.3 1 Twenty-seven
states have subsequently adopted similar legislation aimed at regu-
lating artificial insemination.3 2 Of the twenty-seven states with artifi-
30. Artificial insemination has been defined as the insertion of semen into the
vagina or cervix by artificial means. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY
669 (26th ed. 1981). In general, artificial insemination is most frequently performed
by a licensed physician. Few statutes, however, deal with the details of the procedure
or whether records should be kept. Note, Artificial Insemination: Disclosure Issues, 11
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 87, 88 (1979). Of the states that do have statutory provi-
sions, most require the physician to maintain records. Id.
The three methods of artificial insemination are, artificial insemination by hus-
band (AIH), artificial insemination by doner (AID), and confused artificial insemina-
tion (CAI). In homologous insemination, or artifical insemination by husband, the
sperm is obtained from the husband of the woman upon whom the procedure is
performed. This type is commonly termed AIH and is accepted by many who reject
artificial insemination by donor on moral and psychological grounds. Note, Artificial
Insemination-Its Socio-LegalAspects, 33 MINN. L. REV. 145, 147 n.13 (1949).
The second method of artificial insemination consists of obtaining the sperm
from a third-party donor. This procedure is called artificial insemination by donor.
It is the most publicized method and is known as AID.
The third method of artificial insemination is a combination of AIH and AID,
and is referred to as "confused artificial insemination." This type is commonly re-
ferred to as CA. It involves mixing the sperm from the husband and a third-party
donor before insertion. This technique was initially accepted because it provided the
psychological benefit of giving the husband hope that the child born to his wife might
actually be his son or daughter. Guttmacher, Artificial Insemination, 18 DEPAUL L. REV.
566, 574 (1969). This technique is sharply criticized for both practical and medical
reasons. Id. at 574; Jacobs & Luedtke, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemi-
nation, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 859, 859-60 & n.4. It has been suggested that CAI is also
used by doctors to avoid perjury when they list the husband as the child's father on
the birth certificate. Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artifcial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331,
332 (1979-80) (footnote omitted). CAI may be currently used by single women wish-
ing to prevent any future paternity action by a single donor. See, e.g., Larson, Blood
Test Exclusion Procedures in Paternity Litigation: The Uniform Acts and Beyond, 13 J. FAM. L.
713, 716-17 (1973-74).
31. Act of March 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 74-101-.1, 1964 Ga. Laws 166 (codified at
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1984)). The Georgia legislation had been proposed for 20
years prior to 1964. See Note, Therapeutic Impregnation: Prognosis of a Lawyer-Diagnosis
of a Legislature, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 291, 320-22 nn.169-76 (1970).
A bill prohibiting artificial insemination was introduced in the Minnesota Legis-
lature in 1949. H.F. No. 1090, 56th Minn. Legis., 1949 Sess. (Feb. 28, 1949). Two
other bills were introduced in the Minnesota Legislature that year. One bill would
have only prohibited AID. H.F. No. 1091, 56th Minn. Legis., 1949 Sess. (Feb. 21,
1949). The other bill would have allowed AIH and AID under certain conditions.
H.F. No. 1092, 56th Minn. Legis., 1949 Sess. (Feb. 21, 1949).
32. ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (Michie Supp. 1984); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045
(1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1971); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1983);
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cial insemination legislation,33 twenty-six refer only to women who
are married.3 4 Among statutes which require consent, all but two 3 5
require that the consent be in writing. Only Arkansas, Maryland, and
Michigan presume that the husband consents to the procedure.3 6 In
Louisiana, a husband who has consented to the artificial insemina-
tion cannot disavow paternity.3 7 One commentator has suggested
that conditioning legitimacy upon the husband's consent conflicts
with common law as well as modern statutory presumptions of legiti-
macy.38 At common law, a child born within a marriage or within a
reasonable time after marriage, is presumed legitimate.39
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-101 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f-69n (West
1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21, 43-
34-42 (1984); IDAHO CODE § 39-5405-01 (Michie Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40
§ 1452 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-128 (1981); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1985); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974);
MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 333.2824, 700.111 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. § 257.56
(1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1983); NEv. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1979); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAw § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 551 (West Supp. 1984-85); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, .243, .247,
677.355, .360, .365, .370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1983); TEx. FAm.
CODE ANN. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE § 64.1-7.1 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.26.050 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.47(9), 891.40 (West 1981 & Supp.
1984-85); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1977).
33. See supra note 32.
34. Oregon is the only state with legislation that does not assume that the woman
is married. See infra note 40. The judicial response to artificial insemination is not
well defined because of the small number of decisions involving married women. See,
e.g., People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280,437 P.2d 495, 499, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 11 (1968)
(for purposes of child support, husband was "lawful father" in donor artificial insemi-
nation); Doornboos v. Doornboos, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956) (in
divorce action, husband had no right to child conceived through donor artificial in-
semination); Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1963) (husband liable for child support in donor artificial insemination).
The first reported case involving an unmarried woman was C.M. v. C.C., 152
NJ. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977). In C.M., the sperm donor was a friend whom
the woman had dated for two years. The donor brought an action to obtain visitation
rights which were granted. The court stated that a child should have a father and a
mother whenever possible. Id at 166, 377 A.2d at 825.
35. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 700.111; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306.
36. Arkansas and Maryland and Michigan have established a statutory presump-
tion of consent, which is rebuttable only if the husband's non-consent can be estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1971); MD.
EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b); MICH. COMP. LAws § 700.111(2).
37. See LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 188. This does not actually require that the hus-
band consent. The statute merely states "[t]he husband also cannot disavow pater-
nity of a child born as a result of artificial insemination of the mother to which he
consented."
38. Comment, Artificial Human Reproduction: Legal Problems Presented by the Test Tube
Baby, 28 EMORY L.J. 1045, 1069 (1979).
39. State v. E.A.H., 246 Minn. 299, 305-06, 75 N.W.2d 195, 200 (1956) (a child
born to a married woman during wedlock is presumed to be the child of her husband
[Vol. 12
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The regulatory powers of current artificial insemination statutes
are ineffective due to their lack of substantive content. Oregon is the
only state that does not expressly limit artificial insemination to mar-
ried women or require that the woman's husband give his consent.
4 0
In addition, the Oregon statute is the only statute to address the is-
sue of the donor's health.4' Only fifteen states specifically require a
physician to perform the insemination.42
2. Statutory Presumptions
Applying artificial insemination statutes to surrogate parenting
contracts effectively precludes the parties from entering into a valid
agreement. Twelve statutes create a presumption that the semen do-
nor is not to be considered the biological father of the child.4s Min-
nesota Statutes section 257.56 exemplifies this presumption.44 The
and legitimate). Minnesota Statutes section 257.55 is the codification of the common
law.
40. The Oregon artificial imsemination statute provides: "Artificial insemination
shall not be performed upon a woman without her prior written request and consent
and, if she is married, the prior written request and consent of her husband." OR.
REV. STAT. § 677.365(1) (1983).
41. Oregon Revised Statutes section 677.370 provides:
No semen shall be donated for use in artificial insemination by any person
who:
(1) Has any disease or defect known by him to be transmissible by
genes; or
(2) Knows or has reason to know he has a venereal disease.
OR. REV. STAT. § 677.370 (1983).
42. In Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Minnesota, Montana,
Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming a physician must perform the artificial insemination. For the corresponding
code sections, see supra note 32. It is a felony in Georgia for a nonphysician to per-
form the insemination. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42 (1984).
43. The following states specifically provide that the donor shall not be deemed
the legal father of an artificial insemination by donor (AID) child: Alabama, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Texas, Washing-
ton, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For the corresponding code sections, see supra note
32. In the absence of any artificial insemination statute, the court will presume that a
child born during marriage is the result of the marriage. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 257.55 (1984). These provisions indicate that current legislation protects the do-
nor versus the child.
44. Subdivision 1. If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with
the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated
by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the
natural father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be
in writing and signed by him and his wife. The physician shall certify their
signatures and the date of the insemination, and file the husband's consent
with the commissioner of health, who shall keep it confidential and in a
sealed file. However, the physician's failure to file the consent does not af-
fect the father and child relationship.
All papers and records pertaining to the insemination, whether part of
the permanent record of a court or of a file held by the supervising physician
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statute provides that when the woman's husband consents to the in-
semination, the husband rather than the semen donor is the legal
parent of the child. By applying the presumption in the artificial in-
semination statute to a surrogate parenting agreement, the statute
prohibits the biological father in a surrogate contract from taking
legal custody.45 Instead, the surrogate and her spouse are consid-
ered the legal parents. Therefore, the application of artificial insemi-
nation statutes may invalidate surrogate parenthood agreements and
place paternity in parents unwilling to accept that role.46
Aside from invalidating a surrogate parenting agreement, applying
the presumption to surrogate agreements is clearly misguided. Like
many other states, the Minnesota statute is modeled after the Uni-
form Parentage Act.47 Neither the Minnesota statute48 nor the Uni-
form Act 49 define the status of children conceived by other uses of
artificial insemination such as surrogate parenting. In fact, the com-
missioner's comment to the Uniform Act reveals that the presump-
tion was specifically designed to deal only with the situation where an
anonymous donor is involved.50 Washington has the only statute al-
or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for
good cause shown.
Subd. 2. The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use
in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby
conceived.
MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (emphasis added).
45. This would not be the result if a court recognized that the presumption con-
tained in Minnesota Statutes section 257.56, is rebuttable, or preferably, recognized
that artificial insemination statutes do not apply to surrogate motherhood.
46. Note, supra note 6, at 618.
47. The Uniform Parentage Act provides:
§ 5 [Artificial Insemination]
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the con-
sent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by
a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natu-
ral father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in
writing and signed by him and his wife. The physician shall certify their
signatures and the date of the insemination, and file the husband's consent
with the [State Department of Health], where it shall be kept confidential
and in a sealed file. However, the physician's failure to do so does not affect
the father and child relationship. All papers and records pertaining to the
insemination whether part of the permanent record of a court or of a file
held by the supervising physician or elsewhere, are subject to inspection
only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in
law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5, 9A U.L.A. 579, 592-93 (1979)[hereinafter cited as UNIF.
PARENTAGE AcT].
48. See supra note 44.
49. See supra note 47.
50. The commissioner's comment to section 5 specifically provides:
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lowing the semen donor and the woman to agree in writing that the
donor shall be the father.51 Because the semen donor in a surrogate
contract is not anonymous, but rather a party to the contract, courts
should refrain from applying artificial insemination statutes in this
context.
The presumption created in artificial insemination statutes could
be circumvented. For example, the mother and father of a child
born out of wedlock often declare in writing that they are the biologi-
cal parents of the child.52 Likewise, a surrogate and the biological
father could execute a similar agreement. Contrary to common law,
the effect of the agreement would be that the surrogate's spouse
would no longer be assumed the biological father.53 Presumably,
the surrogate's spouse would need to file an affidavit of nonconsent
to the artificial insemination, thereby permitting the donor to be
considered the biological father.54
3. Health Concerns
Reliance on artificial insemination statutes to regulate the surro-
gate arrangement raises significant health issues. Few artificial in-
semination by donor (AID) statutes regulate the health of the
donor.55 The prevailing lack of donor investigation has corollary im-
plications for surrogate parenthood. There is no standard means of
This Act does not deal with many complex and serious legal problems
raised by the practice of artificial insemination. It was though [sic] useful,
however, to single out and cover in this Act at least one fact situation that
occurs frequently. Further consideration of other legal aspects of artificial
insemination has been urged on the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and is recommended to state legislators.
UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, supra note 47, § 5.
51. The Washington statute specifically provides:
(2) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in arti-
ficial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law
as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived unless the
donor and the woman agree in writing that said donor shall be the father.
The agreement must be in writing and signed by the donor and the woman.
The physician shall certify their signatures and the date of the insemination
and file the agreement....
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(2) (Supp. 1985).
52. In Minnesota, the mother and father of an illegitimate child can declare that
they are the parents of the child. The declaration, however, must be in writing.
MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (1984).
53. This measure is analogous to the attempted declaration made by the couples
in Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 362 N.W.2d 211, 212 (1985). In Syrkowski, the petitioner
sought an order of filiation and the entry of his name on the birth certificate as the
natural and legal father of the child born to a surrogate mother who had been artifi-
cially inseminated with his sperm. Id.
54. If an affidavit of nonconsent is not filed, the surrogate and her spouse are
considered the natural parents. See supra note 44.
55. See supra text and accompanying notes 41-42; see supra note 30 (AID
definition).
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choosing a surrogate. In the surrogate arrangement, it is usually an
attorney rather than a physician who recruits the surrogate. In other
cases, an agency that specializes in surrogate mother arrangements
makes the choice. 56 Although in certain cases the prospective parties
meet, 57 there is no guarantee that the surrogates have undergone
extensive medical histories, genetic testing, or psychological test-
ing.5 8 Because artificial insemination statutes provide an inadequate
framework to deal with surrogate parenting concerns, specific legis-
lation must be enacted.
B. Adoption Statutes in Minnesota
In most cases, the surrogate mother terminates her parental rights
and the biological father's spouse subsequently adopts the child.
Thus, certain courts use existing adoption laws as an analytical
framework.59 Applying adoption statutes to surrogate parenting
causes a number of problems with respect to surrogate fees, timing
of the child's placement with the biological father, and the unauthor-
ized placement of children. 6O
1. Possible Prohibition of the Surrogate Arrangement
One commentator 6 ' has suggested that Minnesota Statutes section
257.03, if applied,62 may specifically prohibit all parties in the surro-
56. See generally Robertson, supra note 14. This lack of proper testing may seri-
ously impinge on the surrogate child's rights. For a discussion of the problem of a
child's rights and a possible solution, see infra text and accompanying notes 204-51.
The lack of such testing may also result in the contract being breached by one of the
parties.
57. Robertson, supra note 14, at 29. The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG) issued guidelines for physicians in "Ethical Issues in Surro-
gate Motherhood." Id. at 31-32. The ACOG not only stated that it had significant
reservations about this approach to parenthood but also cautioned physicians against
recruiting or referring potential surrogates or parents or investing in enterprises spe-
cializing in surrogate arrangements. Id. at 31. Presumably, the American Bar Associ-
ation may object to attorney recruitment because it is a form of solicitation. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY DR 2-103 (1980).
58. See Annas, supra note 24, at 8. The exact number of surrogate agencies is not
reported. There are surrogate mother centers in Arizona, California, Kentucky,
Maryland, and Michigan. Robertson, supra note 14, at 28.
59. See infra notes 99-119. Adoption statutes regulate the placement of a child by
a parent or intermediary. In Minnesota, only a licensed agency may place a child for
adoption. See infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 67-92 and accompanying text.
61. See Gorlin & Miley, Surrogate Parenting, 41 BENCH & B. OF MINN., Jan. 1984, at
17, 18.
62. MINN. STAT. § 257.03 (1984). The Minnesota Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals might hold that existing laws are inapplicable to the surrogate arrangement.
For an explanation of how surrogate agreements can be distinguished from adoption
or foster care arrangements, see infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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gate arrangement from entering into such an agreement for compen-
sation.63 The statute provides that "no person shall solicit, receive,
or accept, any payment, promise of payment, or compensation, for
placing a child in foster care or for assisting to place a child in foster
care." 64 Thus, the surrogate, the biological father, and the attorney
could be considered in violation of the statute by executing a surro-
gate arrangement. 65 Section 257.03 also requires any person who
receives a child in his home with the intent to adopt or keep the child
permanently to notify the commissioner within thirty days after the
child is received.66
A distinction could be drawn between payment in the surrogate
arrangement and payment for foster care. 67 A Minnesota Attorney
General opinion68 has attempted to clarify the statutory prohibition
63. Minnesota Statutes section 257.03 provides:
Any person receiving a child in his home with intent to adopt him or
keep him permanendy, except a person receiving a child from an authorized
agency, must notify the commissioner of human services in writing within 30
days after the child is received. Notice shall state the true name of the child;
his last previous address; the name and address of his parents or legal
guardian and of persons with whom he last resided; and the names and ad-
dresses of persons who placed him in the home, arranged for, or assisted
with arrangements for his placement there; and such other facts about the
child or the home as the commissioner may require. It is the duty of the
commissioner or his designated agent to investigate the circumstances sur-
rounding the child's entry into the home and to take appropriate action to
assure for the child, the natural parents, and the foster parents the full pro-
tection of all laws of Minnesota relating to custody and foster care of chil-
dren. Except as provided by section 317.65, no person shall solicit, receive,
or accept any payment, promise of payment, or compensation, for placing a
child in foster care or for assisting to place a child in foster care. Nor shall
any person pay or promise to pay or in any way compensate any person, for
placing or for assisting to place a child in foster care.
MINN. STAT. § 257.03.
64. Id.
65. Any surrogate parenting agency would likewise be in violation of the statute.
See id.
66. MINN. STAT. § 257.03. An "authorized child placing agency" is defined as a
"local service agency under the authority of the county welfare board or human ser-
vice board, or any agency licensed by the commissioner of human services or a com-
parable authority in the state or the United States to place children for foster care or
adoption." MINN. STAT. § 257.065 (1984). Minnesota Statutes section 257.04 re-
quires the commissioner of public welfare to visit the child and the home to assure
the welfare of the child. Id. § 257.04.
67. In the surrogate arrangement, one party to the agreement is a natural parent
who cannot legally adopt his own child. Therefore, traditional adoption laws should
not be relevant.
68. An Attorney General's Opinion carries considerable weight when there has
been no decision on point. State v. Hartman, 261 Minn. 314, 321, 112 N.W.2d 340,
345 (1961). Other cases have held an Attorney General's Opinion is entided to re-
ceive careful consideration. See County of Hennepin v. County of Houston, 229
Minn. 418, 424, 39 N.W.2d 858, 861 (1949); Mattson v. Flynn, 216 Minn. 354, 362,
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of payment applicable to adoption.69 According to the opinion, a
prospective adoptive couple's payment of a mother's confinement
costs and medical expenses in return for her agreement to place her
illegitimate child with the prospective parents constituted a violation
of Minnesota Statutes section 257.03.70 The opinion emphasized
the definition of "placing children in foster care" in subdivision five
of section 257.01.71 This definition includes "placement in a private
home for the purpose of legal adoption." 72 The opinion also noted
that the legislative intent underlying section 257.03 was clearly to
prohibit such activity.73
The Attorney General's Opinion applying section 257.01 to pro-
spective adoption proceedings could render current surrogate agree-
ment law illegal. 74 Distinctions between the surrogate arrangement
and the payment for foster care can be drawn which remove the sur-
rogate arrangement from the purview of the attorney general's opin-
ion. For example, the surrogate contract is entered into
voluntarily.75 Unlike the woman faced with an unplanned preg-
nancy, the surrogate makes a decision before conception. 76 The pay-
ment to the surrogate is compensation for undertaking the risks of
pregnancy, pain and suffering, risk of death, loss of wages, and loss
of consortium. 77 The woman is contracting for the reasonable value
of her services.78 Thus, the surrogate arrangement should not fall
13 N.W.2d 11, 16 (1944); State ex rel. Hilton v. Sword, 157 Minn. 263, 265, 196 N.W.
467, 467-68 (1923).
69. 1956 Minn. Op. Att'y Gen. 332.
70. Id. at 333.
71. Id. The current version of MINN. STAT. § 257.01, subd. 5 is codified at MINN.
STAT. § 245.782, subd. 7.
72. MINN. STAT. § 245.782, subd. 7 (1984).
73. The Minnesota Attorney General's opinion provides:
In the instant situation we have mutual obligations arising from the agree-
ment between the parties X and Y. The act of X in giving up her child to Y
and her husband for adoption in return for their promise to pay her confine-
ment expenses gave rise to an obligation on the part of Y and her husband
to make such payment. In so doing, Y and her husband discharged their
obligation to X. It is immaterial whether this obligation was discharged by
giving X the amount necessary to pay such expenses or by making payment
directly to the hospital and doctor concerned. In any event X has benefited
to the extent of her indebtedness to the hospital and doctor, and Y has dis-
charged her obligation to X.
1956 Minn. Op. Att'y Gen. at 333.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "payment" as "the fulfillment of a promise, or the
performance of an agreement...." BLAcK's LAw DicMONARY 1016 (5th ed. 1970).
74. Gorlin & Miley, supra note 61, at 17.
75. Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for Solu-
tions, 50 TENN. L. REV. 71, 109 (1982).
76. Id. at 108.
77. Comment, supra note 11, at 28.
78. See Coleman, supra note 75, at 82.
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within the purview of Minnesota Statutes section 257.03 prohibiting
payment for placing a child in foster care.
2. Placement and Custody Concerns
Subdivision one of Minnesota Statutes section 245.783 also cre-
ates problems for the parties involved in executing a surrogate
parenthood arrangement. The statute prohibits an unlicensed indi-
vidual or agency from receiving children for care or placement, from
placing or assisting with the placement of a child in foster care, or
from soliciting money on behalf of the agency.79 At the present
time, no surrogate parenthood agency holds such a license in
Minnesota.
Minnesota Statutes section 257.02 causes two problems. First, it
prohibits any person other than parents or relatives from assuming
permanent care and custody of a child under fourteen years of age
unless authorized by court order.8 0 Since artificial insemination is
presently used in the surrogate arrangement,8 1 and the Minnesota
artificial insemination statute specifies that the semen donor is not
the legal father,82 the biological father in a surrogate arrangement
violates the statute by taking custody.83
It could be argued, however, that the provision does not apply to.
surrogate parenting because the biological father would be assuming
custody. This argument is bolstered by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. The court has repeatedly held that a child's biological par-
ents have the right to custody of their child unless the best interests
of the child require that the child be placed with someone else.84
Section 257.02 also provides that a parent may not assign or trans-
79. MINN. STAT § 245.783, subd. 1 (1984).
80. Minnesota Statutes section 257.02 provides:
No person other than the parents or relatives may assume the perma-
nent care and custody of a child under 14 years of age unless authorized so
to do by an order or decree of court. Except in proceedings for adoption,
no parent may assign or otherwise transfer to another his rights or duties
with respect to the permanent care and custody of his child under 14 years
of age. Any such transfer shall be void.
Id.
81. See supra note 30.
82. MINN. STAT. § 257.56, subd. 2 (1984).
83. The court might choose not to apply the artificial insemination statute given
that surrogate motherhood clearly represents a different fact situation.
84. Bennett v. Bennett, 277 Minn. 227, 229, 152 N.W.2d 187, 189 (1967) (in
custody determinations, the welfare of the child is superior to the desires of either
parent); State ex reL Olson v. Sorenson, 208 Minn. 226, 228, 293 N.W. 241, 241-42
(1940) (natural parents are presumed to be fit and suitable parents to be entrusted
with the care of the child, with the burden upon him who asserts the contrary to
prove by satisfactory evidence); State v. Miller, 187 Minn. 152, 154, 244 N.W. 685,
686 (1932) (anyone contesting the right of a parent to custody of a child has the
burden to show parental unfitness, but parental right must yield to the best interest
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fer their rights or duties for the permanent care and custody of a
child under fourteen years of age except in a proceeding for adop-
tion.85 This section may create problems in a case where the biologi-
cal father's wife is unwilling to adopt, or in a case where the
biological father is single.86 Unless there is an adoption, the surro-
gate will remain a legal parent of the child. Presumably, the surro-
gate could proceed with an action to terminate her parental rights
pursuant to section 260.221.87 Such voluntary terminations of pa-
rental rights have frequently occurred in the past in Minnesota.88
The statute provides that, along with other reasons, parental rights
can be terminated where one of the parents issued written consent
and demonstrated good cause for the termination, or where the par-
of the child); State v. Martin, 95 Minn. 121, 122, 103 N.W. 888, 888 (1905) (right of
parent to the care and custody of child is superior to the rights of a third person).
85. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Any attempt at such a transfer is
void. Id.
86. If the natural father's wife refused to adopt, the surrogate could not transfer
her parental rights at all. She would retain her parental rights. The same problem
arises where the biological father is single.
87. Minnesota Statutes section 260.221 provides:
The juvenile court may, upon petition, terminate all rights of a parent
to a child in the following cases:
(a) With the written consent of a parent who for good cause desires to
terminate his parental rights; or
(b) If it finds that one or more of the following conditions exist:
(1) That the parent has abandoned the child; or ....
(4) That a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child
relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct before the
child or of specific conditions directly relating to the parent and child rela-
tionship either of which are determined by the court to be permanently det-
rimental to the physical or mental health of the child; or ....
(6) That in the case of a child born to a mother who was not married to
the child's father when the child was conceived nor when the child was born
the person is not entitled to notice of an adoption hearing under section
259.26 and either the person has not filed a notice of his intention to retain
parental rights under section 259.261 or that the notice has been success-
fully challenged; or
(7) That the child is neglected and in foster care.
Id.
The state could also terminate her parental rights pursuant to Minnesota Stat-
utes section 260.221. Parental rights will be taken away involuntarily only for serious
reasons. See, e.g., In re K.T., 327 N.W.2d 13, 17-18 (Minn. 1982) (a termination order
based on parental consent will be rescinded only where fraud, duress, or undue influ-
ence are proven).
88. See, e.g., K T., 327 N.W.2d 13; In re Alle, 304 Minn. 254, 256, 230 N.W.2d
574, 576 (1975) (the court held that the requested termination of parental rights was
not available to terminate Mr. Alle's parental relationship with his adopted son ab-
sent fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence); In re Zink, 264 Minn. 500, 119
N.W.2d 731 (1963) (putative father has a right to be heard, present evidence, and
cross-examine witnesses at a hearing to terminate parental rights upon consent of the
mother).
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ent has abandoned the child.89 A provision requiring the surrogate
to terminate her parental rights is normally included in the con-
tract.9 0 However, situations may arise where the surrogate fails to
terminate, 9 ' thereby making the child's rights uncertain.
9 2
3. A Surrogate From Another State
Minnesota Statutes section 257.05 would create difficulties if the
employer attempted to circumvent Minnesota law by hiring a surro-
gate in another state.9 3 Subdivision one of the statute94 prohibits an
individual from bringing or sending into Minnesota any child for the
purpose of placing him or her for adoption without consent of the
Public Welfare Commissioner.9 5 Subdivision one further specifies
that the commissioner must be notified before the child is brought or
sent into the state. The individual must certify where the child is to
be placed.96 Subdivision two exempts a parent, stepparent, sibling,
or other relative from the restriction in subdivision one.97 When an
employer who is also the biological father obtains the child from an-
89. MINN. STAT. § 260.221. The juvenile court has the duty to make a specific
inquiry to verify that statements established "good cause" and must make written
findings of fact. In re Sharp, 268 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. 1978).
90. Custody issues arise when the parties fail to require the surrogate to termi-
nate her parental rights. See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
91. The surrogate would be in breach by failing to terminate her parental rights
if she was required by contract to terminate them. See infra text and accompanying
notes 152-54. Such a clause, however, might not be valid. Cf Prince v. Mass., 321
U.S. 158 (1944) (parent's claim to authority in rearing of children is one of several
sacred private interests); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (constitu-
tional right to rear one's child).
92. For a discussion of the child's rights in a surrogate contract, see generally
infra notes 222-50 and accompanying text.
93. Minnesota Statutes section 257.05 provides in part: "No person, except as
provided by subdivision 2, shall bring or send into the state any child for the purpose
of placing him out or procuring his adoption without first obtaining the consent of
the commissioner of human services .... ." MINN. STAT. § 257.05.
94. Id Subdivision one also requires that an individual who brings a child into
Minnesota must conform to all rules relating to protection of children in foster care.
Id, subd. 1.
95. Id. This notice to the commissioner must include the name, age, and per-
sonal description of the child, the name and address of the person with whom the
child is to be placed, and any other information the commissioner may require. Id.
96. Id The certificate must also include the commissioner of public welfare's
opinion as to whether the home is suitable for adoption if adoption is contemplated,
or that the home meets the requirements for foster homes if an adoption is not con-
templated. Id.
97. Subdivision two of Minnesota Statutes section 257.05 provides: "A parent,
stepparent, grandparent, brother, sister and aunt or uncle in the first degree of the
minor child who bring a child into the state for placement within their own home
shall be exempt from the provisions of subdivision 1. This relationship may be by
blood or marriage." MINN. STAT. § 257.05, subd. 2.
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other state, the surrogate arrangement might be valid under the stat-
ute. If not, the statute may prohibit contracting in another state and
transporting the child across state lines.98
III. COMMON LAW
Courts have had difficulty in dealing with surrogate issues. Three
out of four reported cases have applied artificial insemination stat-
utes and/or adoption laws to the surrogate parenting agreement.
After these decisions, the inherent confusion is even more apparent.
In Doe v. Kelly, 99 the appellants challenged the constitutionality of
certain Michigan Statutes under the fourteenth amendment. 00 The
appellate court applied an adoption statute' 01 precluding the surro-
gate from receiving payment in excess of any expenses actually in-
curred and concluded that the statute did not violate the right to
98. See supra notes 93-97.
99. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183
(1983).
100. Id at 170-71, 307 N.W.2d at 439.
101. Id. The statutory provisions sought to be declared invalid by the parties
provided:
Sec. 54. (1) Except for charges and fees approved by the court, a person
shall not offer, give, or receive any money or other consideration or thing of
value in connection with any of the following:
(a) The placing of a child for adoption.
(b) The registration, recording, or communication of the existence of a
child available for adoption or the existence of a person interested in adopt-
ing a child.
(c) A release.
(d) A consent.
(e) A petition.
(2) Before the entry of the final order of adoption, the petitioner shall
file with the court a sworn statement describing money or other considera-
tion or thing of value paid to or exchanged by any party in the adoption
proceeding, including anyone consenting to the adoption or adopting the
adoptee, any relative of a party or of the adoptee, any physician, attorney,
social worker or member of the clergy, and any other person, corporation,
association, or other organization. The court shall approve or disapprove
fees and expenses. Acceptance or retention of amounts in excess of those
approved by the court constitutes a violation of this section.
(3) To assure compliance with limitations imposed by this section,....
the court may require sworn testimony from persons who were involved in
any way in informing, notifying, exchanging information, identifying, locat-
ing, assisting, or in any other way participating in the contracts or arrange-
ments which, directly or indirectly, led to placement of the person for
adoption.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 710.54 (West 1985).
"A person who violates any of the provisions of sections 41 and 54 of this chap-
ter shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon any subsequent
conviction shall be guilty of a felony." Id. § 710.69.
In Doe, the sperm donor, his spouse, and the surrogate brought suit against the
Michigan attorney general attempting to declare section 54 and its enforcement sec-
tion, section 69, unconstitutional. Doe, 106 Mich. App. at 170-71, 307 N.W.2d at 439.
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privacy. 102 The trial court reasoned that "the temptations of 'money
market babies' exist whether the parties are strangers or friends." 103
The trial court acknowledged that the parties' personal desires and
intentions were in good faith, but held that legislation was the appro-
priate vehicle for legitimizing such payment.1
04
In Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 105 the biological father attempted to use
the Michigan State Paternity Act106 which allows the father of a child
born out of wedlock to acknowledge paternity and request cus-
tody. 107 The surrogate mother filed a petition asking that the bio-
logical father's request for custody be granted.108 The attorney
general intervened arguing that the statutory presumptions created
in the artificial insemination statute applied,109 making a paternity
102. 106 Mich. App. at 174, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
103. See 6 F m. L. REP. (BNA) 3011, 3014 (1980).
104. Id.
105. 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985).
106. The Michigan Paternity Act provides:
(1) Before the birth of a child born out of wedlock, a person claiming
under oath to be the father of the child may file a verified notice of intent to
claim paternity with the court in any county of this state. The form of the
notice shall be prescribed by the director of the department of public health
and provided to the court. The notice shall include the claimant's address.
On the next business day after receipt of the notice the court shall transmit
the notice to the vital records division of the department of public health. If
the mother's address is stated on the notice, the vital records division shall
send a copy of the notice by first-class mail to the mother of the child at the
stated address.
(2) A person filing a notice of intent to claim paternity shall be pre-
sumed to be the father of the child for purposes of this chapter unless the
mother denies that the claimant is the father. Such a notice is admissible in
a paternity proceeding ... and shall create a rebuttable presumption as to
the paternity of that child for purposes of that act. Such a notice shall create
a rebuttable presumption as to paternity of the child for purposes of depen-
dency or neglect proceedings under chapter 12a.
(3) A person who timely files a notice of intent to claim paternity shall
be entitled to notice of any hearing involving that child to determine the
identity of the father of the child and any hearing to determine or terminate
his paternal rights to the child.
MICH. COMp. LAws § 710.33 (Supp. 1985).
107. Mr. Sykrowski entered into a surrogate parenting contract with Mrs. Ap-
pleyard and agreed to pay Mrs. Appleyard $10,000. In order to comply with existing
law, Mrs. Appleyard's husband signed an affidavit of non-consent to the artificial in-
semination. The plaintiff filed a complaint under the Paternity Act and the defendant
answered the complaint by admitting all allegations and joining his request for relief.
Sykrowski, 362 N.W.2d at 212.
108. Id. The surrogate and her husband consistently cooperated with the donor's
efforts to obtain a court order acknowledging his paternity. Id
109. Id. The Michigan statute creates a presumption that the donor is not the
natural father but conditions that presumption on the husband's consent. See MIcH.
CoMp. LAws § 333.2824(6). The court concluded that the presumption was rebutta-
ble. Syrkowski, 362 N.W.2d at 213.
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suit inappropriate.10 In deferring to the legislature, the trial court
and the court of appeals I I I held that the circuit court lacked jurisdic-
tion because the action was beyond the scope of the Paternity Act.112
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed on jurisdictional grounds
ruling that the semen donor is entitled to a paternity determination
under the Act. 13 The court, however, specifically refused to express
any opinion about the biological father's entitlement to any other
relief in the future.114
The third reported case demonstrates a lack of existing legislation
to effectively deal with the problem of custody. In the case of In re
Baby Girl, 115 a Kentucky circuit court refused to uphold a surrogate
agreement. The surrogate and her husband petitioned the court to
terminate parental rights and grant custody to the biological fa-
ther. 116 The court applied the common law rule that a child con-
ceived by a married couple is presumed to be their child.117 The
court reasoned that an "affidavit as to artificial insemination" was
inadequate to establish that the husband was not the father. 18 The
court held that a paternity determination was beyond the scope of
the Kentucky Termination Act.19
Only in the case of Kentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Associates12 0 did a
Kentucky circuit court refuse to apply existing laws to the surrogate
arrangement. In Surrogate Planning Associates, it was argued that the
110. Id. at 362 N.W.2d at 212. The attorney general argued that the surrogate
and her spouse were the legal parents of the child.
111. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983).
112. Syrkowski, 362 N.W.2d at 211. The appellate court noted that the judiciary
should not enlarge the scope of the Paternity Act to cover uncontemplated applica-
tions. 122 Mich. App. at 515, 333 N.W.2d at 94.
113. Syrkowski, 362 N.W.2d at 213. The court noted that the plaintiff was only
seeking an order of filiation formally stating something that no one seriously dis-
puted. Id. The court pointed out that the definition of "children born out of wed-
lock" in the Act was not limited to children born to unmarried women, but also
included children born during the marriage but not the issue of that marriage. Id at
214. "The act was created as a procedural vehicle for determining the paternity of
children 'born out of wedlock'. . . . The act allows fathers to seek and receive such
determinations." Id. In addition, the Syrkowski court noted that such a distinction
could create equal protection problems. Id. The question of legal custody in Syrkow-
ski, however, still must be resolved.
114. Id. at 213.
115. (Cir. Ct. Jefferson Co., Ky., Mar. 8, 1983), reported in 1983 HuM. REPRODUC-
w1VE REP. & L. at 70.
116. Id. The court held that it had no jurisdiction to determine paternity. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. The court also noted that even if the paternity could be established, the
child had been placed without any permission or authority from the Cabinet of
Human Resources. Id
119. Id.
120. 10 Fm. L. REP. (BNA) 1105 (1983) (Ky. Cir. Ct. Sept. 26, 1983).
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Surrogate Parenting Association's right to do business was in viola-
tion of certain adoption statutes.1 21 The court first determined that
because of the existing legal relationship between the biological fa-
ther and the child, adoption laws do not govern surrogate arrange-
ments.' 22 As a result, there was no violation of the prohibition
against payment of a fee for adoption.t 2s The court also held that
there was no statutory prohibition against fee arrangements for the
termination of parental rights.124 In the court's opinion, a policy de-
termination creating such a prohibition was beyond its power.125
These reported cases illustrate the confusion surrounding the law
governing surrogate parenting contracts. Consequently, courts are
floundering due to the lack of legislative response.126 Specific legis-
121. Id The first challenge to the statute was based upon Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 199.601 (1982). The Kentucky Statutes provide that no petition for a termination
of parental rights may be filed until five days after the child's birth. The Kentucky
court acknowledged the legislative intent to give the mother a statutory amount of
time for deciding whether or not to keep the baby, but found that the surrogate
agreement was in accord with the statute. Surrogate Parenting Assoc., 10 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) at 1106. The court noted any attempt to terminate parental rights before the
five day period was non-binding. Id
The Kentucky Attorney General also challenged the procedure under Kentucky
Revised Statutes section 199.590(2), which provides, "[N]o person, agency or institu-
tion not licensed by the cabinet may charge a fee or accept remuneration for the
procurement of any child for adoption purposes." Ky. Rav. STAT. § 199.590(2). The
Kentucky court noted the conceptual difficulty with a natural father being character-
ized as either adopting or buying his own baby.
122. The court noted that since the natural father and the surrogate are the par-
ties to the agreement, it must be analyzed within that framework. Surrogate Parenting
Assoc., 10 Fm. L. REP. (BNA) at 1106. The court specifically stated that:
The natural father pays the surrogate for (1) her services of carrying the
child and (2) her relinquishment of parental rights . . . leaving him as the
only person with a legal relationship to the child. . . . The natural father is
not paying to gain rights to the child because he already has a legal, as well
as a natural, relationship. He seeks to be the only person with such a
relationship.
Id
123. See id The court further noted that there was no assurance that the natural
father was married or that his spouse would automatically institute adoption pro-
ceedings. Id. The court also stated that any adoption would be regulated by the law
of the state in which the natural father's spouse resides, and that Kentucky law may
not even apply. Id.
124. Id. at 1006. The court distinguished between payment for termination of
parental rights where a biological relationship exists, and payment for the adoption
of a child where no biological relationship exists. Id
125. "The proscription against fees for procuring a child is a specific separate pro-
vision [KRS 199.590(2)]; it seems logical that a similarly specific prohibition by the
Legislature would be necessary in order to extend the bar to fees for termination of
parental rights." Id at 1006.
126. To note the inconsistencies in the various courts' reasonings, see supra notes
99-125 and accompanying text.
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lation must be enacted in order to give courts the necessary frame-
work to deal with these issues and to avoid further inconsistencies.
IV. CONTRACT THEORY
The surrogate parenthood agreement is currently governed by
contract theory due to the lack of legislation on surrogate parenting.
As a result, the parties determine the terms of the agreement. The
contract may be entered into with or without the aid of counsel.127
Typically, the employer retains counsel who also advises the surro-
gate.' 28 In accordance with legal ethics, the lawyer should disclose
his conflicting interests.129 Requiring counsel in surrogate arrange-
ments protects the parties from problems relating to the custody of
the child.130
A. Contents of the Agreement
In most cases, the terms of the contract provide that the surrogate
agrees to be artificially inseminated,isi carry the fetus to full term,
and then relinquish her parental rights after birth.32 The contract
also specifies the surrogate fee.133 The contract may require the bio-
logical father and his spouse to adopt the child after birth.
Oftentimes, important terms are not drafted into the surrogate
contract. For example, some surrogate parenthood contracts do not
provide insurance coverage for all parties involved.m34 Also, certain
contracts do not require psychological testing of the surrogate13 5 or
proper prenatal care, and may condition the employer's acceptance
on the lack of physical defects of the child. Some contracts may for-
bid the woman to abort unless required to do so for health reasons.
127. Cf Robertson, supra note 14, at 29.
128. Id. at 30.
129. Id. The lawyer should disclose that he is paid by and represents the employ-
ers. Failure to do so would be a violation of the Code of Ethics. E.g., MINN. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b)(2)(1985). Critics of surrogate parenthood are
legitimately concerned with the possibility that third parties or the employer may
take advantage of the surrogate. See 11 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) at 3002; cf. Robertson,
supra note 14, at 30. The lawyer's relationship with the employer may, consciously or
unconsciously, prevent the lawyer from serving the interests of the surrogate.
130. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.03 (1984). See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying
text.
131. Coleman, supra note 75, at 75. For a discussion regarding the surrogate's
refusal to be inseminated, see id. at 83-85.
132. Id. at 75.
133. Fees for the surrogate's services are approximately $10,000. Keane, supra
note 7, at 269.
134. Legislation proposed in the Minnesota House of Representatives fails to re-
quire insurance coverage. See Proposed H.F. No. 534, infra note 159.
135. For a discussion of how proposed legislation in Minnesota addresses this is-
sue, see infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
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Other contracts may require that the surrogate refrain from activities
such as smoking or drinking. 136 In addition, not all contracts specify
the respective parties' remedies for breach.
In most matters, parties are free to contract without judicial inter-
ference, but the public policy concerns inherent in a surrogate con-
tract limit the parties' freedom to contract. 13 7 Most policy
arguments focus on the issue of buying and selling children.1Ss
Other public policy arguments question the surrogate's voluntari-
ness in the arrangement. 139 These concerns point out the need to
regulate the contract. Although the parties may enter into a surro-
gate agreement, public policy concerns may still render the contract
void.140 Without appropriately tailored legislation, courts will re-
solve public policy concerns by turning to existing statutes. These
statutes, however, are not comprehensive and distort the respective
parties' rights and remedies.141
B. Remedies for Breach
Assuming specific legislation could make a surrogate contract legal
and enforceable, a breach of a surrogate contract would create
unique problems for the parties. In addition, breach of a surrogate
contract would also involve another party, the state, in its role of
parens patriae 1 4
2
If the employer breaches the contract prior to conception by refus-
ing to perform,143 then the surrogate could sue for the amount due
136. See Coleman, supra note 75, at 85.
137. See Note, supra note 17, at 603 & n.16.
138. Id. Contracts encompassing such acts are usually deemed void as against
public policy. Id.
139. See, e.g., Article, supra note 13, at 49-51.
140. A void contract must be distinguished from a voidable contract. "Voidable"
means that the contract may be avoided by one or more of the parties. J. CALAMARI &
J. PERILLO, CoNTRACTrs § 1-11, at 18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CALAMARI & PE-
RILLO]. One commentator has asserted that surrogate parenting contracts are voida-
ble contracts under a "best interest of the child" analysis as opposed to being void or
illegal. Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting: A Critical Analysis of the Recent Kentucky
Experience, 69 Ky. LJ. 877, 891-1001 (1980-81). This author questions whether ren-
dering the contract voidable is really in "the best interests of the child" or merely
serves the interests of the parties to the contract. See infra notes 204-40 and accompa-
nying text.
141. See supra notes 62-106 and accompanying text.
142. See infra note 214; see also MINN. STAT. § 257.33 (1984) (welfare of child is
state's concern).
143. There are numerous situations in which a breach may occur. For example,
the surrogate's employer may breach by failing to pay the agreed compensation, by
refusing to submit to AID, or by refusing to accept custody because the child is hand-
icapped or of the wrong sex.
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under the contract.144 The situation becomes more complex, if the
employer breaches the contract during pregnancy. Presumably, the
surrogate could abort if she is within the appropriate trimester.' 45 It
is unlikely that the surrogate would be able to abort beyond the
point of viability.146
If the surrogate breaches, similar problems arise. If the breach oc-
curs prior to artificial insemination, then the employer could sue to
recover any costs advanced.'4 7 This remedy is arguably inadequate,
but damages for emotional distress are usually not recoverable in
contract claims. 148 Specific performance is an unlikely remedy given
both the nature of the contract and a court's unwillingness to super-
vise specific performance of personal service contracts.' 49
Breach of contract by the surrogate during pregnancy is also possi-
ble. The surrogate could completely breach the contract by aborting
the child.150 The surrogate could partially breach the contract by
failing to receive proper prenatal care, or by failing to properly care
for herself in accordance with the terms of the contract.'51 In either
situation, the employer's remedy of money damages is inadequate.
Each party's remedies are unclear after the child is born. Cases
144. Presumably the surrogate could also sue for any other costs incurred, such as
medical expenses.
145. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (right of personal privacy is an
aspect of the protected liberty interest). Roe does not stand for the proposition that a
woman may choose to abort whenever she wishes. In Roe, the Court held that during
the first trimester of pregnancy, a state may not ban, or even closely regulate abor-
tions. During the second trimester, the state may regulate the abortion procedure in
order to protect its interest in the mother's health. Id. at 159, 162-64.
146. In Roe, the Court held that at the beginning of the third trimester, the fetus
becomes "viable." Id. at 162-64. After viability, the state has a "compelling interest"
in protecting the fetus and may regulate or even proscribe abortion. Id.
147. Coleman, supra note 75, at 85.
148. See, e.g., Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Prop. and Cas. Co., 277
N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979)(in absence of specific statutory provision, a party is
not entitled to damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress for breach of
contract, unless the breach is accompanied by an independent tort); but see Jarchow v.
Transamerica Tide Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 948, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 484
(1975) (courts may adjudicate mental distress claims when plaintiff has suffered sub-
stantial damage apart from the alleged emotional injury).
149. See Coleman, supra note 75, at 83.
150. Minnesota's proposed legislation would prohibit the surrogate from aborting
except for medical reasons. See infra notes 200-02. Such legislation is highly suspect
in light of recent Supreme Court opinions. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976) (statute giving pregnant woman's spouse or parents absolute right to
veto the woman's decision held unconstitutional). It is unclear whether that right is
waived in the surrogate contract. See Note, supra note 17, at 612.
151. See Coleman, supra note 75, at 86. For example, the surrogate might smoke
or drink in violation of the contract. Paternity might also be an issue if the surrogate
fails to abstain from intercourse until conception is proven, or if a paternity test casts
doubt.
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exist in which the surrogate mother has decided to keep the child.152
On one occasion, the surrogate reached an out-of-court settlement
and won custody.153 In most situations, however, a suit based on
traditional contract principles does not provide adequate compensa-
tion for the employer. A possible alternative for the contracting
couple would be to commence litigation on a conversion theory.154
The state may become involved if the couple breaches the surro-
gate contract. For example, under Minnesota law, if the surrogate
chose to bear the child or was ordered to bear the child by the court
despite the breach, then the state might have a duty to offer appro-
priate social services during her pregnancy. 155 In addition, the state
might have a duty to provide child support to the surrogate.1 56 The
state's remedies in this situation are equally unclear since it is uncer-
tain whether the state may seek reimbursement from the breaching
couple for any services provided.157
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN MINNESOTA
Existing statutes do not effectively protect the surrogate, the bio-
logical father, or the child.158 All the parties could be better pro-
tected by appropriately tailored legislation. In 1983, a bill designed
152. See Agreement by Couple to Pay Girl for Baby, THE TIMES (London), June 21,
1980, at 1, cot. 2.
153. Abstract, Am. J.L. & MED. 323, 337 n.69 (citing NEWSWEEK, April 6, 1981 at
83; Morrow, Surrogate Mother Gets Custody of Fought-Over Child, L.A. DAILY J., June 5,
1981, at 1, col. 2.).
154. Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Hope For Childless Couples Breeds Legal Exposure For
Physicians, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 311, 322 (1983) (citing Delzio v. Presbyterian Hosp.,
74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)). In Delzio, the plaintiff was undergoing in vitro fertili-
zation when the chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology of the
hospital decided that it was unethical and immoral for physicians to perform such
procedures. The in vitro fertilization program was terminated after the second day of
incubation. The jury ruled in favor of the hospital on the plaintiffs conversion claim,
yet awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in compensatory damages for mental suffering.
In the surrogate parenting context, a conversion claim might be successful in the
late stages of pregnancy. Recovery under a conversion theory creates the impression
that the child is a possession rather than a human being. Thus, the claim might be
disallowed on the basis of public policy. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.02 (1984) (deny-
ing the right of one to transfer or assign to another, other than a relative, the rights
or duties respecting permanent care and custody of a child under 14 years old).
155. Minnesota Statutes section 257.33 requires the commissioner of human serv-
ices "to offer appropriate social services to any pregnant woman who is in need of
social services under criteria prescribed by rule of the commissioner." MINN. STAT.
§ 257.33 (1984).
156. "The Commissioner [of human services] shall also offer appropriate social
services to the woman and her child after the birth of the child." Id
157. Perhaps the proposed legislation could resolve this problem by providing for
state reimbursement by the breaching party.
158. See Coleman, supra note 75, at 118.
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to alleviate many of the inherent problems in surrogate parenthood
was introduced in the Minnesota Legislature.159 The bill, however,
was dismissed after review by the House Judiciary Committee.160
This portion of the article discusses Proposed House File Number
534. Essentially, the bill provided the mechanics of filing a surrogate
petition. 161 It also established a number of procedural safeguards for
the parties,162 and required that certain terms must be included in
the surrogate agreement.1 63
A. Petitions
The bill permitted surrogate parenting where either a couple or a
single father hired a surrogate. 1 64 The bill created two types of peti-
tions to the court: (1) a petition for surrogate adoption by the bio-
logical father's spouse;16 5 and (2) a petition to establish paternity for
a single biological father. 166 In either case, the bill required that the
surrogate parenting agreement must be executed prior to the filing
of petitions. 167
If the biological father's spouse filed a petition for adoption, the
court would be required to order a full investigation. The court also
would be forced to consider a number of factors such as the perma-
159. H.F. No. 534, 73rd. Minn. Leg., 1983 Sess. (copy on file at the William
Mitchell Law Review Office) [hereinafter cited as H.F. No. 534]. Due to the issues
raised by the proposed House File 534, a legislative task force on surrogate parenting
was formed in Minnesota. Ruth Weidell, supervisor of the adoption unit in the Min-
nesota Department of Public Welfare, serves on the task force. Gorlin & Miley, supra
note 61 at 17. Ms. Weidell's involvement stems from the legislature's incorporation
of the proposed House File 534 into the adoption statutes. Telephone interview with
Ruth Weidell, Minnesota Department of Public Welfare (July 25, 1985). It is Ms.
Weidell's position that proposed House File 534 should be placed apart from the
adoption statutes because any adoption which may occur is a subsequent act. Id.
160. See 1983-84 MINN. HJ. INDEx 376.
161. See infra notes 164-79.
162. See infra notes 180-94.
163. See infra notes 195-99.
164. The bill did not allow a single woman to hire a surrogate, in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Note also that
Minnesota's artificial insemination statute requires that the woman be married.
MINN. STAT. § 257.56, subd. 2. See supra note 44. Such a distinction would also be a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
165. Proposed H.F. No. 534, supra note 159, § 2, subd. 1. This section provided:
"If a spouse of a natural father desires to adopt a child to be conceived pursuant to a
surrogate parenthood agreement, that person together with the natural father shall
file a petition for surrogate adoption with the juvenile court of the county in which
the petitioner resides or in which the surrogate resides." Id
166. Id § 4, subd. 1. The bill provided that, "If a single natural father has entered
into a surrogate parenthood agreement with a surrogate, that natural father, together
with the surrogate, shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the surro-
gate and to establish the paternity of the natural father." Id.
167. See supra notes 165-66.
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nence of the family unit and the petitioner's "moral fitness."168 Af-
ter the investigation, a hearing would be held if adoption was not
recommended.169 If adoption was recommended, the court could
enter a decision without a hearing.170 Even if the court ruled against
the petitioner, the couple could still receive the child. Actual legal
custody, however, would be in the biological father only.171
Where the biological father was single, no investigation was re-
quired.172 The only requirement was a certificaton of paternity filed
with the court upon verification of pregnancy. 17s The underlying as-
sumption in the bill appeared to be that a "natural" parent is a fit
parent.17 4 One commentator has suggested that "perhaps the legis-
lature should consider extending this certification process to single
168. Subdivision 1 of section 3 of the proposed bill provided:
In a surrogate adoption proceeding initiated pursuant to section 2, the court
shall direct a full investigation by an employee or agent of the court, a child
placing agency, or the department of public welfare. The following shall be
considered in the investigation:
(a) The capacity and disposition of the petitioner to give the child to be
conceived pursuant to the surrogate parenthood agreement love, affection,
and guidance, and to educate the child;
(b) The capacity and disposition of the petitioner to provide the child to
be conceived pursuant to the surrogate parenthood agreement with food,
clothing, education, permanence, medical care or other remedial care rec-
ognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care,
and other material needs;
(c) The permanence as a family unit of the petitioner's home;
(d) The moral fitness of the petitioner;
(e) The mental and physical health of the petitioner; and
(f) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particu-
lar surrogate adoption proceeding.
Proposed H.F. No. 534, supra note 159, § 3, subd. 1.
169. Subdivision 1 of section 3 of the proposed bill provided:
The court shall review the report prepared and filed pursuant to this sec-
tion. If the report recommends that the surrogate adoption be permitted,
the court, within ten days after receipt of the report, shall enter an order
certifying the suitability of the petitioner for surrogate adoption. If the re-
port recommends that surrogate adoption not be permitted, the court,
within ten days after receipt of the report, shall conduct a hearing to review
the report and to take other evidence regarding the suitability of the peti-
tioner. If the court is satisfied as to the suitability of the petitioner based on
the evidence produced at the hearing, the court shall enter an order certify-
ing the suitability of the petitioner for surrogate adoption.
Id.
170. Id.
171. This hypothesis assumes that the surrogate's parental rights have been
terminated.
172. See Proposed H.F. No. 534, supra note 159, § 4, subd. 1.
173. Id. § 5, subd. 1.
174. See State ex rel. Rys v. Vorlicek, 229 Minn. 497, 500, 40 N.W.2d 350, 351
(1949) (presumption that parents are fit and proper persons to have the care and
custody of their children and those claiming the contrary have the burden of over-
coming the presumption); State ev reL Lehman v. Martin, 95 Minn. 121, 122, 103
N.W. 888 (1905). See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.55, subd. 1 (1984). Perhaps with the
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biological fathers as well."175
The bill also required the biological father and the surrogate to
sign a paternity acknowledgement.17 6 The surrogate would be re-
quired to relinquish parental rights prior to the child's birth.t77 Af-
ter completion of the surrogate's sixth month of pregnancy, the
court would grant an interim order giving the natural father cus-
tody.1 78 The interim order was designed to avoid subsequent dis-
putes in a situation where a child is born with physical defects.
t79
B. Safeguards
The proposed legislation would have instituted procedural safe-
guards for the surrogate and her spouse. The bill provided that a
surrogate's parental rights could not be terminated by court order
without a hearing.180 If the surrogate objected, the court would stay
the order for termination and conduct hearings on the asserted
claim. 18 1 The surrogate's husband could object by asserting a pater-
advent of new methods of reproductive technology, the state should take a more
active role in investigating the fitness of "natural parents."
175. Gorlin & Miley, supra note 61, at 21.
176. Proposed H.F. No. 534, supra note 159, § 5, subd. 2.
177. Id § 6. "Consent to the relinquishment of parental rights over a child con-
ceived pursuant to a surrogate parenthood agreement shall be executed by the surro-
gate and her husband, if the surrogate is married. The consent shall be executed
before the birth of the child to be effective upon the birth of the child." Id.
178. Id. § 7.
After the receipt of notice of the surrogate's pregnancy and the comple-
tion of the surrogate's sixth month of pregnancy, the court shall issue an
interim order granting custody, care, and control over the child to the natu-
ral father and, in the case of a surrogate adoption proceeding, the peti-
tioner. The interim order shall grant to the natural father and, in the case of
a surrogate adoption proceeding, the petitioner the exclusive authority to
consent to all medical, surgical, psychological, educational, and related serv-
ices for the child. The interim order shall be effective immediately upon the
birth of the child.
Id.
179. Gorlin & Miley, supra note 61, at 21.
180. See Proposed H.F. No. 534, supra note 159, § 8. Arguably, such hearings dis-
tinguish surrogate parenting from the concerns that Minnesota Statutes section
257.03 addresses. For the text of this statute see supra note 63. Hearings provide for
a surrogate's due process rights as well.
181. See id., subd. 5. Minnesota Statutes section 257.03, subdivision 5 states:
If the surrogate objects to the entry of the order terminating the surrogate's
parental rights, and if the surrogate's husband is not determined to be the
child's father under subdivision 4, the court shall stay the entry of the order
and shall have a hearing to determine whether to terminate the parental
rights of the surrogate. The court shall enforce the surrogate parenthood
agreement and order the termination of the surrogate's parental rights un-
less the surrogate demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the
best interests of the child are not served by the termination of the surro-
gate's parental rights.
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nity claim.' 8 2 The biological father was not permitted, however, to
assert a nonpaternity claim.183
Legal representation of the parties was also considered. The bill
provided that an attorney could not represent both the surrogate
and the biological father.84 The bill, however, ignored the rights of
the child. Representation for the child was not required.185 The bill
also failed to regulate other entities, such as surrogate parenting
agencies. These agencies may set up the agreement between the bio-
logical father and the surrogate.18 6 In this situation, the agency is
replacing legal representation and may be practicing law.187
The bill also considered the economic aspect of the surrogate con-
tract; specifically, it provided that the Commissioner of Health would
establish a maximum fee for the surrogate's services.188 A minimum
fee of $10,000 was established.189
One unique feature of the bill was that it placed responsibilities on
the inseminating physician.190 These responsibilities are designed to
182. Id, subd. 4. Minnesota Statutes section 257.03, subdivision 4 provides:
If the husband of a surrogate asserts a claim of paternity, the court shall stay
the entry of the order and shall have a hearing to determine the paternity of
the child. If the court finds that the surrogate's husband is the father of the
child, the petition for surrogate adoption shall be dismissed. If the court
finds that the husband of the petitioner is the natural father of the child, the
court shall enter an order of filiation on behalf of the natural father which
terminates the claim of paternity by the surrogate's husband.
Id.
183. Gorlin & Miley, supra note 61, at 21. Such a provision would be desirable in
cases where the sperm donor is uncertain whether he is actually the biological father
of the child. Id.
184. Proposed H.F. No. 534, supra note 159, § 9, subd. 2.
The attorney who represents the prospective natural father and his spouse,
if married, shall not represent the surrogate in the execution of a surrogate
parenthood agreement. An attorney representing a person executing a sur-
rogate parenthood agreement shall also sign the agreement, but not as a
party.
Id
185. For a discussion of the need for representation for the child, see infra text
and accompanying notes 204-217.
186. Some surrogate parenting agreements are negotiated at a surrogate parent-
ing agency. An attorney may not even be involved.
187. If an attorney does assist the agency, questions arise whether the negotia-
tions of the agency may constitute the unauthorized practice of law. The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct state that "A lawyer shall not .... (b) assist a person
who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5 (1983)
(amended 1984).
188. Proposed H.F. No. 534, supra note 159, § 11.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 12.
A physician shall not artificially inseminate a person who the physician
knows to be a surrogate unless the physician is professionally satisfied with
the mental and physical suitability of the surrogate and the natural father,
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protect the child. The physician could inseminate only where he was
professionally satisfied with the mental and physical suitability of
both the surrogate and the biological father.191
The bill also provided for the death of any party prior to termina-
tion of the surrogate's rights. If the biological father or the adoptive
mother92 died prior to termination of the surrogate's parental
rights, then the agreement would remain in force.'93 In addition,
the surrogate would be entitled to full compensation and could keep
the child if the biological father and adoptive mother died.194
C. Required Terms
The bill specified that several terms must be included in the agree-
ment.' 9 5 The surrogate could not agree to form a parent-child rela-
tionship during the pendency of the interim order. 196 The surrogate
would also be required to assume all risks incident to the employ-
ment,197 and to adhere to all medical instructions.198 In addition to
the required terms, the parties were allowed to include additional
terms. 199
One contract term required by this bill may be unconstitutional.
The bill specified that a surrogate could not agree not to abort un-
less the inseminating physician200 advised that an abortion was nec-
essary to save her life.201 Such a provision may conflict with a
and, if a proceeding under section 2 is commenced, unless an order certify-
ing the suitability of the adoptive parent under section 3 is presented.
Id. Should a physician not act in accordance with this provision, the physician could
conceivably be sued for malpractice.
191. Id.
192. "Adoptive parent means a natural father's spouse who proposes to adopt a
child to be conceived pursuant to a surrogate parenthood agreement." Id. § 1, subd.
2.
193. Id. § 10, subd. 3(c).
194. Id.
195. Examination of all of the required terms in the agreement is beyond the
scope of this article. For a discussion of all required terms, see Proposed H.F. No.
534, supra note 159, § 10, subd. 3.
196. Id, subd. 1(b). It is not possible for the surrogate to form a parent-child
relationship while the child is in-utero.
197. Proposed H.F. No. 534, supra note 159, § 10, subd. 1(d). This includes the
risk of death. Id. Presumably, this provision is to preclude wrongful death actions by
the surrogate's estate.
198. Id., subd. l(g)-(j).
199. Id. § 10, subd. 4.
200. Id., subd. 1 (i). It is unclear why the inseminating physician should make the
determination rather than the surrogate's own physician. The inseminating physi-
cian would not be in a better position than the surrogate's own physician to assess
the surrogate's needs.
201. Id
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woman's right to privacy.202 In addition, this provision violates
traditional contract law. According to contract law, the surrogate
would breach the agreement by aborting, but could compensate her
employer in money damages.20
VI. RIGHrs OF THE CHILD
In surrogate parenting cases, the underlying concern of the courts
and the legislature is the "child's best interests." 204 An analysis of
the child's rights and how they will be jeopardized in the surrogate
context reveals that courts and legislatures have overlooked one very
crucial solution: the child's need for representation in the surrogate
agreement. 205 Whether acting as independent counsel or a guardian
ad litem, 206 it is essential that a representative for the child be in-
volved during all phases of the agreement. This begins with the ne-
202. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976) (statute giving
pregnant woman's spouse or parents absolute right to veto woman's decision to
abort is unconstitutional). See supra note 150.
203. See generally CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 140, § 14-4, 521 (1977) (in gen-
eral, contract remedies are not directed at enforcement promises to prevent breach
but rather at relief to redress breach). E. FARNSWORTH, CoNrTRAc'rs § 12.1, at 812
(1982). Punitive damages are not imposed in breach or contract actions. Id. Since
specific performance is an equitable remedy, equity would stay its hand if the remedy
of damages at law was adequate. Id at 821.
204. See C.M. v. C.C., 152 NJ. Super. 160, 167, 377 A.2d 821, 825 (1977) (a
child's best interest is furthered when the court establihes a donor's paternity); State
ex rel. H. v. P., 90 A.D.2d 434, 457 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1982) (rejecting mother's
request that husband submit to blood tests to determine father's paternity of AID
child). For a critical analysis of the holding in CM. v. C.C., see J. GOLSTEIN, A.
FREUD & A. SoLqrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHI I 188-89 (1973).
Justice Cardozo is credited with establishing the "best interest" test in the
United States. Note, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in Divorce Custody Proceedings,
27 HASTINGS LJ. 917, 921 n.30 (1976) (citing Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429,433, 148
N.E. 624, 626 (1925)). Similar language may be found in at least three earlier cases.
Id. (citing, United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (C.C.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256))
("the real, permanent interests of the infant"); Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 465,
111 P. 21, 25 (1910) ("the interest and welfare of the child"); Chapsky v. Wood, 26
Kan. 650, 653, 40 Am. R. 321, 323 (1881) ("the welfare and interest of such child").
205. This concern is analogous to the growing recognition of the need to provide
independent legal counsel for children whose parents are involved in dissolution
proceedings. Two commentators assert that "despite the obvious stake each child
has in his placement, courts and legislatures have failed to grant him party status, or
to establish his right to representation by counsel, except in juvenile delinquency
proceedings." GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SoLrrr, supra note 204, at 65.
206. Either independent legal counsel or a guardian ad litem could represent the
child. See infra note 211 and accompanying test. One representing the child as a
guardian ad litem, however, might not act as a pure advocate actively participating in
the drafting process. Moreover, the participants in surrogate parenting might view a
guardian ad litem differently from independent legal counsel. Presumably, represen-
tation for the child could be predicated on a third-party beneficiary theory.
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gotiation process and extends through the performance of the
contract.
Recent cases decided by the United States Supreme Court have
ruled that a child has a right to be heard and to be represented by
counsel.207 This rule is narrow in scope and is usually limited to
delinquency hearings or to cases where the child's liberty is in jeop-
ardy.208 Commentators have argued that the constitutional purpose
of providing a child with representation is to assure that the child's
interests are effectively represented in court.209 Courts are unable to
fully protect the child's rights because they are acting in an impartial
decision-making capacity.210 Nevertheless, commentators have also
conceded that the fourteenth amendment does not require the
"best" result for the person whose interests are at stake, but rather,
it requires that a person be heard in proceedings that affect his
interests. 2 11
207. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). Gault involved due process guarantees in
juvenile delinquency proceedings. Id at 4. The Supreme Court held that the four-
teenth amendment required appointment of counsel, notice, the right to remain si-
lent, and the right to confront witnesses. Id. at 59-60. Other due process rights
accorded adults, such as the right of appeal and the right to a transcript of the pro-
ceedings, were not extended to juveniles." Id. at 58; Bersoff, Representationfor Children
in Custody Decisions: All That Glitters Is Not GAULT, 15 J. FAm. L. 27, 27 n.2 (1976-77).
See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966). At issue in Kent was the due
process right of a child in the transfer of jurisdiction from juvenile court to adult
criminal court.
208. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 41; Kent, 383 U.S. at 561-63. One commentator has
suggested that Gault "stimulated an interest in the rights of children which has ex-
tended legal benefits to minors far beyond those granted in the decision itself." Ber-
sof, supra note 207, at 27.
209. Note, supra note 204, at 930. Other reasons advanced include the following:
(1) the language ofjoinder and intervention statutes indicates that the child has inter-
ests at stake which cannot be protected unless he participates in the proceeding; (2)
the child's interest in a healthy environment is so important that this issue should not
be entrusted to the court and adult parties alone; (3) the analogies between the cus-
tody proceeding and other actions in which minors have independent standing justify
the use of identical procedural safeguards when custody is the issue. See, e.g., idt at
928-930.
210. The vast majority of custody settlements receive the rubber stamp of the
court without an investigation to discover whether attorneys for the adults have con-
sidered the child's best interests. Note, supra note 204, at 919. Moreover, the judge
cannot adequately assess the best interests of child because of time pressures. The
judge serves as an umpire, not as an advocate. Hansen, The Role and Rights of Children
in Divorce Actions, 6J. FAm. L. 1, 7-8 (1966).
211. For a discussion of potential problems with such an argument, see Note,
supra note 204, at 931-32; Note, Due Process for Children: A Right to Counsel in Custody
Proceedings, 4 N.Y.U. REv. LAw & Soc. CHANGE 177 (1944).
The Oregon Court of Appeals formerly recognized the conflicts of interest of
children, parents and the state in termination proceedings. The court held that the
judge must appoint independent counsel for the minor. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v.
Wade, 19 Or. App. 314, 322-23, 527 P.2d 753, 757 (1974), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S.
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At the present time, a child does not have the constitutional right
to be heard, or to be represented in custody or foster care cases.2 12
It is generally assumed that the child's parents2 lS or the courts 2 14 are
capable of representing the child's interests.215 Legal commentators
are now challenging this assumption.216 They point out that the lack
806 (1975). This case was overruled by In re D., 24 Or. App. 601, 610-11, 547 P.2d
175, 181 (1976), cert. denied, C. v. F., 429 U.S. 907 (1976). The court stated the
following:
[W]e are now satisfied that due process does not, in fact, require the pres-
ence of independent counsel in every case and that the implementation of a
rule to that effect will, in many cases, fail to enhance the protection of the
interests of children while unnecessarily complicating proceedings already
involving difficult and complicated issues.
In re D., 547 P.2d at 179. The new standard "permits the trial court to determine on a
case-by-case basis whether separate counsel for the child is required in any given
termination or adoption proceeding." Id. at 181.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, held that failure to appoint a guardian to aid in
the determination of a child's welfare was grounds for reversal. Mawhinney v. Ma-
whinney, 66 Wis. 2d 679, 685-86, 225 N.W.2d 501, 504 (1975).
In some states, the power to appoint counsel is discretionary. See, e.g., ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-321 (1965 & Supp. 1984-85); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-116
(1973 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-43 (1958 & Supp. 1985); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.12 (1981 & West Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-358 (1984);
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.425 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-11.2 (1984-85); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 594 (1974 & Supp. 1985). Other states make provision for the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11-10 (Vernon
1975 & Supp. 1985) (guardian); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.045 (West 1981 & Supp.
1984-85) (friend of the court). In jurisdictions lacking the statutory authority to
make such appointments, the court may rely on its inherent rulemaking power. Note,
supra note 204, at 925.
212. Representation For The Child In Custody And Foster Care Matters: A General Introduc-
tin, CHILDREN's RTs. REP., Feb. 1977 at 2 [hereinafter cited as Representation for the
Child]. It is assumed that in custody proceedings, a child's liberty is not at stake and
that if a child has any "standing" in such matters, his parents or the courts are pre-
sumed capable of representing his interests. Id.
213. Children are considered incapable of knowing what is in their own best inter-
ests. Bersoff, supra note 207, at 29. There is a presumption in law that parents are
competent to protect their children's interests. Id But see Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187,
193 (1962) (experience has shown that custody, so vital to a child's happiness, fre-
quently cannot be left to the discretion of the parents).
214. In assessing the child's best interests, the court's role as parens patriae may
conflict. See Note, supra note 204, at 921-22. For a discussion of the development of
the doctrine of parens patriae, see Mlyniec, The Child Advocate In Private Custody Disputes:
A Role In Search of a Standard, 16J. FAM. L. 1, 3-6 (1977-78). Use of the parens patriae
rationale was critically evaluated by the United States Supreme Court in Gault, 387
U.S. at 16.
215. Representation for the Child, supra note 212, at 4.
216. E.g., Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAm. L.Q. 343 (1972);
Inker, Expanding the Rights of Children in Custody and Adoption Cases, 5 FAM. L.Q. 417
(1971); Podell, The "Why" Behind Appointing Guardians Ad Litem for Children in Divorce
Proceedings, 57 MAR. L. REV. 103, 109 (1973); Shepherd, Solomon's Sword: Adjudication
of Child Custody Questions, 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 151, 168 (1974); Wald, Making Sense Out of
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of representation overlooks the reality that parents may have sepa-
rate and distinct interests from those of their children.217
A. Representation for the Child
There are situations when the parents cannot represent the best
interests of the child. For example, in a dissolution proceeding the
parents' conflicting interests interfere with the child's interests. Rep-
resentation for the child in the surrogate context is even more criti-
cal.21 8 Unlike a dissolution proceeding, the biological parents rarely
meet in surrogate arrangements. The parties have entered a busi-
ness agreement, and the two parties have adverse interests. Neither
party is likely to negotiate provisions in the child's best interests.2 19
Unless a dispute between the parties arises, the court will not be ac-
tively involved in the negotiation or the performance of the
contract.220
B. The Role of the Child's Representative
Deciding the role of the child's representative is difficult. The
choice is between representation as a "guardian" or representation
as an "advocate." A "guardian" representative should act in the
"best interests" of the child. A "pure advocate" would elicit the
child's preferences. 221
In the surrogate parenting context, it is impossible for the repre-
sentative to elicit the preferences of the child. It is possible, how-
ever, for the attorney to gather evidence concerning the "best
interests" of the child. The attorney can also draft provisions in the
contract that protect the child. Although it is impossible to foresee
the Rights of Youth, 4 HuM. RTs. 13, 20 (1974); Note, A Case for Independent Counsel to
Represent Children in Custody Proceedings, 7 NEw ENG. L. REV. 351 (1972).
217. Representation for the Child, supra note 212, at 2. "The court has found that
custody disputes between parents raise a great amount of emotional fervor in the
parties to the legal proceeding. This makes the trial court's job more difficult and the
participants frequently irrational." Venable v. Venable, 3 Ohio App. 3d 421, 423,
445 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (1981). See also Smith v. Smith, 640 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982) ("[T]hese two adults (at least in age) utilize the courts and their children
to vent their spleen against each other").
218. See generally supra notes 204-17 and accompanying text.
219. It also cannot be assumed that the attorneys for either party will consider the
child's respective interests. Attorneys have a duty under the Code of Professional
Responsibility to interpret evidence in the light most favorable to their clients. ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY, canons 5 & 7 (1979).
220. For a discussion of whether the court would provide for the child's best inter-
ests in the event of a dispute, see supra note 210 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Wizner, The Child and the State: Adversaries in the Juvenile Justice System, 4
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 389 (1972); Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment
Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540 (1975).
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all contingencies, the attorney could ensure that the child's rights are
not violated.
1. Inheritance Rights
At common law, the privilege of inheritance was denied to illegiti-
mate children. The United States Supreme Court has affirmed this
rule.22 2
The inheritance rule is relevant in the surrogate parenting context.
A child produced by artificial insemination with sperm of an anony-
.mous donor is not presumed to be the legal child of the biological
father.223 The surrogate's spouse is presumed to be the biological
father.224 Applying this rule, a child carried by a surrogate, whose
biological father is known, would also not be presumed to be his
legal child. If inheritance becomes an issue, it is unrealistic to as-
sume that the surrogate's family would recognize the child as a legiti-
mate heir.225 The child then might not be entitled to inherit from
either the biological father or the "presumed" father.226
Other inheritance issues must be considered. If the surrogate dies
before terminating her parental rights, it is unclear whether the child
would have a valid claim under her estate. 227 If the surrogate relin-
quished the child after birth but failed to terminate her parental
rights, the child's rights may be even less clear. Any claim against
the surrogate's estate or the estate of the biological father's spouse
would be subject to challenge. Perhaps the greatest infringement on
the child's potential inheritance rights would arise if the biological
father breached the contract by refusing to take the child. If the sur-
rogate also refused to keep the child, then the child would not have a
claim to either party's estate.228 Thus, the child could either be ac-
222. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978); see generally Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624, 676-82 (1980). In a number of other cases,
however, the Court has protected the rights of illegitimate children in wrongful death
and workers' compensation cases. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (wrong-
ful death); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (wrongful
death); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (workers' compen-
sation benefits).
223. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.56, subd. 1 (1984).
224. Id., subd. 2.
225. See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 261.
226. The biological father's estate might argue that, according to the statutory
presumption, the child has no inheritance rights. See supra notes 222-34 and accom-
panying text. In addition, the heirs of the estate of the "presumed" father could
argue that upon the surrogate's termination of parental rights, any inheritance rights
from her spouse were terminated at that time.
227. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
228. But see Note, supra note 17, at 635. The child might recover under some
other theory such as wrongful life. Id. For a discussion of wrongful life theories in
Minnesota, see infra note 249.
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cepted into the biological father's home or refused and still have no
inheritance rights.
The impact of these preclusions on inheritance may be modified
by the enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act.229 One of the
objectives of the Act is to eliminate the legal effects of illegitimacy. 230
In jurisdictions where the Uniform Parentage Act has not been
adopted,231 the child's inheritance rights may be speculative if not
totally non-existent.
A child does not possess the constitutional right to be born free of
the stigma of illegitimacy.232 Although a woman's right to privacy in
making fundamental personal decisions is well established,23 the
state should avoid illegitimacy in the surrogate parenting context to
prevent uncertainty in inheritance rights.2S4 The state has the re-
sponsibility to protect a child's welfare. Representation for the child
in surrogate arrangements would effectively ensure that both parties
to the contract clearly state the inheritance rights of the child.
2. Custody
Custody focuses on the rights of the parties to the contract. It is
an issue of critical importance to the child. Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 518.17 and section 257.025 both focus on the "best interests of
the child" in determining custody disputes.23 5 A typical surrogate
contract, however, does not address the "best interests" of the child.
229. "The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to
every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT,
supra note 47, § 2. However, Minnesota substitutes "may exist" for "extends equally
to every child and to every parent." MINN. STAT. § 257.53 (1984).
230. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr supra note 47, § 2.
231. The Uniform Parentage Act has been adopted in the following states: Ala-
bama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
232. See Wolff & Cirillo, The Bastard's Cause of Action: A Statutory Cause of Action for
Illegitimate Children, 19J. FAm. L. 463 (1980-81). Courts reject illegitimacy as a basis
for recovering under tort and contract law. See, e.g., Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d
52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (child has no cause of action for illegitimacy absent
statutory authority); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963)
(no cause of action in tort for illegitimacy); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215
N.W.2d 9 (1974) (no cause of action in tort for the pain, anguish, and embarrassment
of being born illegitimate). In each of these cases, the child failed to state a cause of
action upon which relief could be granted.
233. Cf Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (right of privacy
in decision to use contraceptives extends to minors); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973) (right of privacy encompasses a woman's decision to terminate her preg-
nancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (right to privacy in decision to
use contraceptives extends to single persons).
234. See generally C.M. v. C.C., 152 NJ. Super. at 166, 377 A.2d at 822-25.
235. In Minnesota, the court is required to evaluate the love, affection, and emo-
tional ties, as well as other factors in custody disputes. MINN. STAT. 257.025.
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There are numerous situations in a surrogate arrangement which
could lead to a custody dispute. For example, if the surrogate
breached the contract by refusing to relinquish the child, it is unclear
whether the child would have a right to demand custody time with
his biological father.236 If the surrogate relinquished custody, but
refused to terminate her parental rights, then the child may have a
right to establish a relationship with the surrogate. There is also a
possibility that the surrogate might later choose to locate the surro-
gate child. In this situation, it is unclear whether the child would be
entitled to visitation rights with the surrogate. 23 7
A provision in the surrogate contract requiring an independent
legal representative for the child can solve many of the potential cus-
tody problems.238 Representation at the initial stages of contract ne-
gotiation and throughout the surrogate agreement will force the
parties to consider the child's rights.239 The parties could for exam-
ple, include a provision in the agreement regarding who will take
custody of the child if the child is retarded or handicapped. If a dis-
pute arises at a later date, an informed counsel will be available to
represent the child's interests.2 40
236. This hypothesis assumes that the father seeks to maintain a relationship with
the child. Natural fathers have gained increased rights with respect to their illegiti-
mate children. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that an un-
wed father cannot be denied custody of his children absent a hearing and a finding of
parental unfitness).
237. See Gorlin & Miley, supra note 61, at 20. Children born in surrogate arrange-
ments often inquire about the true identity of their mother. The major issue in this
situation is whether the original birth certificate should be withheld from the child.
This issue has been addressed by many states' adoption statutes. Statutes that re-
strict a child's right to discover his or her true parents are based on two main pre-
sumptions. It is believed that a restriction of this type protects the "integrity" of the
adoptive process. It also insures the stabililty of the newly formed parent-child rela-
tionship. Note, The Current Status of the Right ofAdultAdoptees to Know the Identity of Their
Natural Parents, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 677, 680-83 (1980). Adoptees, claiming the right to
gain access to their birth records, have not fared well in federal courts. See, e.g., Yes-
terday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977) (preventing adult
adoptees from discovering the identity of their parents); Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon,
459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (adult adoptees must show good cause to gain
access to their records).
In surrogate mothering, like adoption and AID, there is a risk of psychological
harm to the child. Robertson, supra note 14, at 30. The child may be strongly moti-
vated to learn the absent parent's identity and to establish a relationship with the
mother and her family. "While this is a concern, the situation is tolerated when it
arises with AID and adoptive children." Id.
238. See generally supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. Counsel for the child should be
required to make the parties reach custody agreements within the surrogate contract
itself.
240. Even if the counsel is unavailable for representation, there will be at least an
adequate record for the resolution of a dispute.
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3. Support
The support obligation is another issue that counsel for the child
could address. If the surrogate refused to terminate her parental
rights, she would presumably be liable for support. 241 A representa-
tive for the child could bring an action to force the biological father
to help with child support. Subdivision four of Minnesota Statutes
section 518.17 provides that the court may order either or both par-
ents to support the child.242 A court could order the biological fa-
ther in the surrogate relationship to provide support payments to the
child, or it could order the surrogate to pay if she breached the
contract.
The spouse's support obligations are unclear if the biological fa-
ther's spouse fails to adopt.24s If the biological father dies or sepa-
rates from his wife, then the child may be entitled to support
payments from that spouse. There are no clear answers to these
questions. Nevertheless, counsel for the child could ensure that sup-
port issues are clearly defined in the contract. Thus, a child's inter-
ests in support would be addressed with minimal conflict if
independent legal representation is available.
4. The Right to Know
As in cases of artificial insemination, the surrogate child should
have a right to know his biological history. The lack of artificial in-
semination records injures a child's right to obtain information on
his family's medical history. One study found that ninety-three per-
cent of physicians kept permanent records on recipients of artificial
insemination, but only thirty-seven percent kept records on the chil-
dren born by artificial insemination. 244 This lack of record-keeping
has a significant impact on an child's rights in three situations. First,
241. See Note, supra note 17, at 620-21.
242. The Minnesota child support statute reads as follows:
The court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a
child of the marriage to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his sup-
port, without regard to marital misconduct, after considering all relevant
factors including:
(a) The financial resources and needs of the child;
(b) The financial resources and needs of the custodial parents;
(c) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage
not dissolved;
(d) The physical and emotional condition of the child, and his educational
needs; and
(e) The financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 4.
243. Gorlin & Miley, supra note 61, at 20.
244. Annas, supra note 24, at 10. "Moreover, 83% opposed any legislation that
would mandate the keeping of records because it would make protection of anonym-
ity of the donor more difficult." Id.
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if a donor is used more than once, and a defective child is born, then
the use of the donor's sperm should be discontinued for the protec-
tion of future children.245 Second, the child will not be able to re-
spond accurately to questions regarding family medical history.246
Third, if no records are kept, the child will not be able to determine
his genetic father.247
This lack of records is relevant to surrogate parenthood. Current
practices are based primarily on protecting the interests of the surro-
gate, the attorney, and the employer.248 Legislation should be
drafted to mandate that records be kept on children of surrogate
mothers. Until that time, representation can ensure that proper
records will be kept. Lack of records fails to protect the interests of
innocent surrogate children. It also increases the possibility of law-
suits based on "wrongful life"249 and "wrongful birth" theories. 250
CONCLUSION
Surrogate parenting issues must be addressed. The current prac-
tice of applying existing legislation to such a novel enterprise further
complicates the issues. Legislation must be drafted which is specifi-
cally concerned with providing for the best interests of the child. Fu-
ture legislation should include a number of changes in surrogate
parenting laws. Proposals should state that the artificial insemina-
tion statute does not apply to the surrogate contract. Legislation
should also recognize the right of the surrogate to abort and provide
remedies for both parties on breach. Intermediaries, such as surro-
gate parenting agencies and the inseminating physician, should be
regulated. Physical and mental investigations of the surrogate
should be required and a minimum age for surrogates must be estab-
lished. The most important requirement is that the child be repre-
sented in the surrogate parenting agreement. Without such
legislation, clarification of the rights and liabilities of the parties will
245. Id. The survey revealed that physicians administering artificial insemination
by donor (AID) were not adequately trained in genetics and made many erroneous
and inconsistent decisions. Id at 7.
246. Id. at 10-11.
247. Id. at 11.
248. See id.
249. In a wrongful life claim, the child does not allege that the physician's negli-
gence caused the child's deformity but rather the physician's negligence caused the
birth of the deformed child. The child essentially argues that he or she should not
have been born. Courts have not been receptive to such causes of action. See Note,
supra note 154, at 337 n.213 (1983). Currently, Minnesota prohibits wrongful life
causes of action. MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subd. 1 (1984).
250. Minnesota also prohibits wrongful birth claims. MINN. STAT. § 145.424,
subd. 2.
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remain unclear. 251
Providing the child with legal representation throughout the nego-
tiation of the surrogate agreement will ensure that the child's rights
and interests are protected. Even though an attorney cannot forsee
all possible problems, he can effectively represent the child in such
issues as inheritance rights, custody rights, and support obligations.
251. If the court applied the artificial insemination statute, the surrogate and her
spouse would have legal custody. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
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